Well, this point of view of Napoleon can be seen as constructive, as a demand for historical accuracy and fair balance, or as bad cynicism:
On the one hand, the disenchanted man, who used to be in power and understood human nature perfectly, could have meant that historians tend to argue only their own theories and to ignore all facts that don't match them; in that case there would be not a single accusation about Napoleon that would not be made plausible by some historian with far-fetched arguments.

On the other hand, the banished emperor had unlimited trust in the work of future historians and meant - as order from the man which was always interested in history - that historical research has to find arguments and facts which show that every decision he made was inevitable to him, despite his critics saying they weren't.


However, and with whatever approach we view Napoleon - it's time to finally forget the monarchist propaganda of the 19th century and to start with precise and unemotional research about this time. But for many years, especially in German literature, texts - summaries written without any investigation of well-known facts - are copied without any investigation from older publications, even at the highest academic levels. And who cares about that period anyway? Mostly people who find their own beliefs confirmed and - aware or unaware - cling to monarchist nostalgia. And so the old, completely wrong clichés and information get passed on, in school lessons right up to the 21st century, in exhibits, in history books. But especially in the endless sociological or political nonsense, which is a specialty of historians of the last 30 years, who say what matches their view of the world, ignoring facts or historical documents.

But if we base our study on those facts and documents, which are available in endless quantities, and if we further work only with checkable facts, the usual picture of Napoleon, which is of an egomaniacal aggressor who wants to beat the whole of Europe and can only be stopped by the English, falls apart.

During his time at Toulon, Napoleon takes a leading part in important events, but remains a subordinate officer. His first real mark in history happened accidentally with his engagement at Barras' side against the royalist riot in Paris, on 5 November 1775. With this, he wrote himself a strong republican reference. We have to take up a neutral position: if the riot was right, if history should have turned another way, all this is personal thinking, which mustn't influence historic writing. And a second point is that the fast sequel of events in the French revolution includes the danger of losing overview, but the overview is necessary for understanding and rating history

That Napoleon instead of Barras got command of the national army and soon took command in Italy definitely leads back to his strong acquaintance with the leading people of the revolution. The contact with these people - which is also where he got to know Josephine - was surely helpful, but to say the command in Italy was only because of Josephine's influence would be an unacceptable underestimation of the intelligence and competence of leading revolutionaries, especially of Carnot's!

Especially his time in Italy seems to be important when you look for the unrestrained, war-loving despot. While the war against Austria can be ascribed to him, from 1792 on it was not a "Napoleonic" problem, but in fact he's to blame for some of the aggression in Italy. But like so often in the case of Napoleon: the accusations are wrong. The grip against Venice is often explained as an example of Napoleon's aggression, but if you stick to the facts, you see that the Austrian commander Beaulieu fought against Venice, occupying a fortress as base and only after that Napoleon reacted by making Venice a theatre of war and the center of the restructuring in Italy - not least again with influence of the Habsburgs. It's similar to other states in Italy, who started to fight against the revolution and risked the consequences, to admit they were unexpected and wide-ranging. The same thing happened in Naples and Portugal.

It must be added that we say the countries these day were fully legal. We forget that in fact in all these countries, including the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollern, the Romanows, Hanoverians, the Bourbons and the Pope, many people wanted to have a democratic, often even republican, country. The war gave them the chance to create new forms of government while the leading aristocrats fought against the French revolution. We have to take a stand for the truth. The old monarchist dictatorships are not a bit more legitimate than the leadership of Napoleon.

Even if Napoleon was already a politically independent actor in the re-organization of Italy, even if he didn't exceed his competence - because senior front commanders of the past absolutely had the power to every now and then negotiate an armistice - already on account of the endless communication ways, the big frame of the events was still not a "Napoleonic" one.

Rather, the new state institutions in Paris and the old dictatorships lead the events until 1799, no doubt about it. And thus also the Egyptian adventure, supposedly the first expression of "despotic megalomania", doesn't look strategically as such a silly thing because it's also related to an anti-English strategical memorandum of Napoleon. However, the Egyptian campaign could not have happened without huge approval by the French government.

A direct conquest against England was not practicable at this time - to start a new theatre of war and to fight there against English interests was a rather logical beginning - particularly remembering the critical role played not by the English military, but by English money. England was having major military difficulties in India at this time. Napoleon wanted an essential part of the French expedition corps to be ferried over Suez to India to support the Indian troops under Tipu Sahib. But the fact that the (more than just) Indian fight against the British colonial power broke down too fast prevented this chance. In addition, Talleyrand's betrayal, who should have argued for the intervention in Egypt against the Turkish sultan - best of all should have won the Ottomans or also the Persians for a joint campaign against India - however he has committed arbitrarily against the arrangements. With the well-known result of the war entry by England.

However you look at these events: the political cause for all of them is still not Napoleon at this time. Indeed, after the victory of Jaffa a horrible incident occurred, which was maybe one of the few real crimes of Napoleon: already in the fights before the Syria campaign, prisoners were dismissed after they gave their word of honor not to take part in upcoming battles. Only about 400 soldiers who had been already dismissed once were found among the approximately 3000 prisoners, who belonged to the Turkish defenders of Jaffa. Of course it can be also considered as - at best - naïve, that a combatant under a despotic regime like the Ottomans would have the possibility to move away from war simply because of a promise to the "heathens".

At the same time, the French army supposedly had no possibility to feed the prisoners, and thus Napoleon agreed, completely against his custom, after a war council decided to give the order to execute all prisoners. Now the explanation of this moral conflict is of course of big interest historically. However, it changes nothing of the state of affairs. And depending on to which worth system you feel obliged: however, from today's point of view this is to be evaluated as a serious crime against helpless people; these events do make Napoleon a war criminal - even if in his time this wasn't seen as strongly as now - comparable to the completely unnecessary bombardment of the civil town quarters of Copenhagen by Wellington and Nelson to force Denmark into a fast capitulation.

And the Syria campaign also requires historical correction: to this day the fairy tale is parroted that archduke Karl would have gained the first victory against the "invincible" Napoleon during his Danube crossing in 1809. Fact is that a nearly unknown Turkish commander, Djezzar Pasha, in cooperation with the English general Sydney Smith had defeated Napoleon at Akko the first time in the field. However, paper, especially in history books, seems to be patient.

The real era of Napoleon - and one should never forget that there is no government of a single person; there cannot be a government of a single person because many must always profit and introduce themselves, otherwise rule would have no continuation - begins with his return from Egypt and "his coup". However, exactly at this point it becomes clear that Napoleon has been pushed to the top because the political situation has become untenable in France, the problems have grown over the head of those responsible for them, who try to become someone with a popular figurehead at the head of the state. Napoleon himself looks like a rather ridiculous figure during the coup, who is used by others and who only later realizes the possibilities of his situation.

His sex stories are also legendary. Besides, his words and writing towards women seem rather clumsy. The experienced and in every regard skilful Josephine apparently really was his big love. In it he was deeply disappointed. After Josephine, there was only the relation with Maria Walewska, which was a very deep relation. All the other stories have more the character of, as we would say today, "groupies"; groupies of power and money


Thus he has behaved, and thus the women have also behaved, as far as can be understood about two centuries later. Napoleon himself was only in a few moments a likeable person, just like his mistresses, who also seem unpleasant, bought over and over again. Strangely, a marriage with the young princess of Habsburg developed. What was first an ugly political agreement, it developed, especially after his big wish for a successor had gone into fulfillment, into a real affection on both sides, as some documents seem to cover.

In this phase he also starts his biggest achievements. Napoleon doesn't end the revolution, but brings up a form of government which makes the new principles permanent - in institutions, in schools, in independent public courts and in industry and trade.

His efforts in road constructions are groundbreaking, as well as in the building of the canal of Saint-Quentin - perhaps these projects also helped his successful fight against the high unemployment. He achieved influence in the internal security, the city development of Paris, where you can still see great buildings of the empire and the construction of dependable food supplies - not least in cooperation with the USA. He built an "economic and labor market policy" in almost modern form.

His schedules of work are groundbreaking in road constructions, in the building of the canal of Saint-Quentin - maybe also orders which helped his successful fight against the high unemployment. He achieved the penetration of the internal security, the city development of Paris, where you can still see great buildings of the empire and the construction of dependable food supplies - not at least in cooperation with the USA. He built an " economic and labor market policy" in nearly modern form.

However, these steps also cause Napoleon to get in the center of the persistent coup and restoration attempts which strike France at this time. Attempts concentrate upon the new leader, the really promising bearer of hope for the future. After failed attempts by the emigrated Bourbons, who wanted him to be a stirrup holder until their return to France, he catches the eye of the violent conflicts going on at the time. Napoleon's reaction was to build huge police facilities, a precise observation and control of the agitation in the newspapers and in the churches and in addition the suppression of the Jacobins and in the end, to prevent any possible alliance with the old power in France, the arrest of the duke of Enghien. At this time a scream should have gone through Europe because this has been laid out as a prodigious legal break. It had already the appearance as if these reproaches would hold, even if we have to assume, that the scream was to be heard merely in some powerhouses of the old dictatorships - however, at least 90 percent of Europe was completely uninterested in the whole thing.

However, the charge of perversion and judicial murder is serious for a head of the government. But the fact, which has to be found with precise investigation of the matter, is that the duke was involved in an attempted coup. In addition the French legal position at that time allowed to arrest a French citizen even in foreign states. Due to this fact there only remains the question whether the access of the military on the territory of Baden was right, considering international law.

The heart of the matter was that Enghien even said during his trial in the military court that he feels it to be his task to cause a coup to restore the old order - certainly a courageous man of big honesty and directness till the end. Also, preparations for reaching this goal were made and English money was accepted to finance the realization. And for these things - not because of the attempted coup in Paris - the duke was sentenced to death and duly executed. Napoleon would have had the power of pardon and in other cases he had made a frequent use of it. One can claim that he also had this possibility in this case. But why should he have had to pronounce a pardon? While in exile, he still fights with this question, coming over and over again to the conclusion that this deterrent example was necessary to end the protests and domestic riots: it was necessary to end the attempts. The documents of this time show he was probably right - the other attempts, like in Schönbrunn in 1809, were differently motivated. This is incomprehensible though, because if Enghien had to do nothing with the attempts, why did they stop after his death? Only because the remaining French Bourbons lived in fear to be called to the court? It remains unclear.

Shortly after this chain of events, Napoleon attempts to handle more peaceful matters, bringing order to France's affairs in Europe and mainly gaining control over its colonies. An area known as "Louisiana" in North America was bought from Spain - which was seen as a threat by the young USA. The USA received appropriate financial compensation. Something especially nasty, and seen by many as a terrible exposure of Napoleon's point of view, happened during the events in Saint Domingue: after the abolishment of slavery after the convention of 1794, the many Afro-American became free, built up an extremely interesting "statehood", took over the Spanish and English part of the island, and were slowly moving towards an independent state under the leadership of the black governor and brigade general Toussaint L´Ouverture. Napoleon counters this with a punishment expedition under command of his brother-in-law Leclerc. L'Ouverture is lured into a under-the-belt trap and is arrested as a rebel, sentenced in France, and dies a short time later in a prison in the Jura. Napoleon's approval of the reintroduction of slavery in the colonies - documented evidence of this has unfortunately not been found yet; in any case, the sickening and deeply condemnable decision is taken, after pressure by the cotton planters - is first not met, the substantial French expedition corps of 35.500 men had already lost 2.000 men through combat and disease. L'Ouvertures successor manages to achieve independence, as first state in Latin America. Napoleon is a clear supporter of slavery during the whole situation, which means his personal ideas of freedom and equality for all people in reality couldn't have gone that far. His intervention in Hispaniola is named by many historians - in many ways incorrectly, but with a certain pithiness - as "Napoleon's Vietnam".

A tricky problem is Napoleon's empire, his coronation obviously contradicts the revolutionary and republican ideals. Could it be said that he betrayed the revolution, undid its effects? Now we come to extremely difficult questions. In the foreground stands an outspoken misunderstanding. We must not forget how much the Roman example was still anchored in the political minds of the era. Fact is, that even the translation of "Empereur" with the German "Kaiser" leads us in the wrong direction. What the people of the time wanted, those involved in politics as well as the simple public, understandably, was a calming down of the situation, a stabilized society. Many thought this possible with the return of the Bourbons to Paris, others thought the solution lay in an "Emperor" with far reaching powers. This "Bearer of Power" must be able to make unopposed decisions, checked by other chosen bodies. Napoleon didn't do anything other than that, from stabilizing the economy and the national treasury, to internationalizing the law, to countering the military aggression against the new state. Following the example set by the Romans, after mastering the crisis situation, such an emperor must step down again. Whether it should be possible for a democracy - then, only minimally present in France of course - to make this title of "Bearer of Power" succesable due to great prosperity, is of course an extreme question. Can a democracy decide about its own disbandment? That is a very interesting question, both with lawful rights in mind, as well as the history of law. Can such an "Emperor" really be checked by appropriate controlling bodies? Many find the position of US-President of such a construction. And for absolute emergencies we in Germany and even Austria have provided the necessary power for our federal presidents to become rudimental crisis managers. The position of French "Empereur" was in any case not the emperor in the German sense of the word, not in the last place considering Napoleon himself was surrounded by supervising bodies. In fact, the actual adjuration happened to the republic of France. Once again, the insight and understanding of Napoleon's time can be found in the details. General condemnation on the other hand brings is nowhere - at least if one wants to escape from the illusions, the concealment and the excuses made by the opponents of the revolution.

Another especially important point: France and its "commissioned crisis manager" Napoleon had to wage, besides his different domestic functions, constant war against the aggression of the old monarchist dictatorships, against England practically without interruption. This wasn't because he was looking for a fight - the recent aggression directly after the peace agreement of Amiens came in reality from England - over and over again against Austria, against Prussia and above all against Russia. Against the present historical view the arrangement in coalition wars is senseless. It's a result of the ineradicable propaganda of the time. The war in 1805, as well as in 1809, was caused by Austria - against all reached peace agreements. The attack in 1806 was provoked by Prussia and Russia, the attack on Russia in 1812 by the Russian breach of contract, the attack on Portugal by its break of the continental barrier signed in 1802. None of these powers can have not known the results. In fact, they wanted these results (war) and if one changes practically and impartially the point of view and if one looks at the things from Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna of the past, then these dictators had their rights and did everything in their power to protect their realm another 100 years. However, none of these wars would have been possible without English money (in 1811, the Habsburg state went bankrupt, despite all this financial assistance and military help). So essentially, if we examine the guilt for all these wars, the essential elements are the fault of the English regime. The "Napoleonic wars" should be understood, completely in contrast to the usual name, as the "English wars" and thus join a long series of wars already started in the 18th century in which always English interests and English possessions stood were the background of big, bloody conflicts of the monarchist dictatorships.

But there has to be a specification - at least as a refinement: also in England the will for war and the will to save the old monarchy can't be seen in general, probably not even in context. There was a quite large and also temporarily high-powered "party of peace", people who wanted to follow industry and trade. Many people, also in the poor groups of the population, saw no reason to fight the French all the time. One should talk sensibly here, not generalizing "England", but of the war-pursuing group around the king or deepen this representation still further. On the other hand this clique asserted itself and used almost all of England's resources for warfare, while these others allowed this again and again. Because of that, perhaps it's allowed to speak of the whole of "England" in general again or just of "Prussia", "Austria", "Spain", "Portugal" and "Russia" where all this was the same - with many different interest groups with quite different political weight.

Also the continental barrier is an originally English method for applying pressure on her enemies - first only from sea. But with the expansion by capture and seizure of neutral ships and the compulsory recruitment of foreign seamen, it became truly criminal. Napoleon had to deal with the English blockade of the French harbors and later of the whole European coast. He answered the English blockade from sea with a French blockade from land. However it was put through with so much hardness and was put in all agreements. So there should have been other objectives. The time of Napoleon falls in a phase of huge development in Europe. Population figures doubled in short time and others numbers trebled, the agricultural industrial production in factories, but still even more in "production publishers" production reached never before seen amounts. Thus the real idea behind the continental barrier was to make the European countries independent of English import and to make them survive on their own production. However, here the old dictatorships did not go along - it is doubtful whether this beginning was generally understood. In any case, in Vienna, Berlin, Moscow and in the smaller capitals nobody welcomed thought-out economic policy.

The old dictatorships weren't able to kill the ideas of the French revolution (to be able to manage very well without a monarchy) - which again cannot be seen lose from the American revolution and also not from Switzerland. There, rule was already snatched from the respective monarchies in a long, tremendously slow and bloody development of government. Ridiculous are only the "historians" who expected to see a "peacetime lasting 40 years" in Europe after Napoleon's defeat. The battlefields in the Greece fight for freedom of 1821, the Russian attack on Turkey in 1825, the cruel expansion of the English colonies, the uprising of the population in Belgium, Poland's fight against the Russians, the Italian fight against the Habsburg's dictatorship until 1848, the European-wide events in 1848/49, the Russian invasion of Hungary - all this was simply the enforcement of royalty's God-given rights! Right?

Anyway, in Europe the positive achievements of the Napoleonic era have been widespread:
civil- and people's rights in constitutions, freedom of religion, civil marriage, free business and the agricultural reform based on free peasants, schools and universities which don't have ideological backgrounds or are under control of the state, independent courts, the duty to pay taxes even for aristocracy and clergy.

The end of Napoleon's time is difficult to judge, because the exact course of his illness isn't known, although it can be seen for a long time. There are indications that he slowly lost his mental abilities. The many campaigns and wounds left their traces on his health. His unbelievable pace of work lost drive. The frequent betrayals within his circle made him loose power and trust. In the wars he had been forced to fight, he didn't have time to show his most distinctive ability, the brilliant statesman. The alarming passage in the constitution to continue a new dynasty of "Emperors" is at least partly, if not mainly, caused by his dwindling trust in his careless and corrupt companions.

His death was a very lonely one, a touching one. His legacies are his writings. So now, knowing about the intolerably manipulative and sloppy publications, one must be careful not to fall into the other extreme: blind trust in his writings, as if he could withstand the temptation to exaggerate. But you should at least listen to his point of view. And you should keep a healthy distrust for all other historic writings, as much as they are advertised, recommended to you or academically founded.


Advisable literature:

Bonaparte N.: Napoleon´s Memoirs; Learning Links, 1986
Cronin, Vincent: Napoleon Bonaparte; Glasgow 1971
Gallo, Max: Napoleon; Pan New Ed edition 2004
Schneider-Ferber K.: Napoleon; Konemann Bilingual edition, Cologne 2002
Dufraisse, Roger: Napoleon; McGraw-Hill Humanities, 1991
Bourienne/Phipps: Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte; University Press of the Pacific, 2001
Rambaud, Patrick: The Battle: A Novelle; Grove Press, 2001
Rambaud/Hobson: The Retreat; Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004
Montgomery, Bernard Law Viscount of Alamein: A History of Warfare; Harpercollins, 1983


felicitous film versions:

"Napoleon", Regie Yves Simoneau, mit: Christian Clavier, Isabella Rosselini, Gerard Depardieu, John Malkovich. In 2 Teilen auf DVD

"Waterloo", Regie: Dino de Laurentiis/Sergei Bondarchuck, mit: Rod Steiger, Christopher Plummer, Orson Welles, Jack Hawkins, Virginia McKenna. DVD bei Columbia Pictures